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Reexamining Conflicts of Interest:
When is Private Counsel Necessary?
A characteristic of liability insurance policies' is the obligation of
the insurer to defend claims against the insured that come within the
coverage of the policy.2 The liability insurer faces many formidable
legal issues with respect to the duty to defend when a question con-
cerning insurance coverage exists.3 In this situation, the duty of the
insurer to defend will often turn on an issue of fact that is material
to the third party's case against the insured.4 If the insurer wrong-
fully chooses not to defend the insured, the insurer may be subject
to liability in excess of the policy limits. 5 In addition, the liability
insurer who breaches the duty to defend can be held liable to the
insured for pain and suffering damages.
6
If the insurer chooses to defend, the action is tendered to the in-
surer's defense counsel, who then represents the insured.7 The tripar-
tite relationship between the insurer, counsel, and the insured' has
created sensitive problems with respect to coverage issues.9 For ex-
ample, since intentional conduct is often excluded under a liability
I. CAL. INS. CODE §108 provides: "Liability insurance includes...insurance against loss
resulting from liability for injury, fatal or nonfatal, suffered by any natural person, or resulting
from liability for damage to property, or property interests of others ....."
2. See R. KEETON, BASIc TEXT ON INSURANCE LAw §7.6, at 462-89 (1971) (explaining
the duty of the liability insurer to defend). A liability insurance policy ordinarily contains pro-
visions that require the company to defend any suit against an insured alleging bodily injury
or property damage within the scope of the insuring agreements, even if the suit is groundless,
false, or fraudulent. Id. at 462.
3. See, e.g., Note, Use of the Declaratory Judgment to Determine a Liability Insurer's
Duty to Defend-Conflict of Interests, 41 IND. L.J. 87 (1965); Comment, The Insurer's Duty
to Defend Under a Liability Insurance Policy, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 734, 738 (1966); Morris,
Conflicts of Interest in Defending Under Liability Insurance Policies: A Proposed Solution,
1981 UTAH L. REV. 457, 459 (1981).
4. Note, supra note 3, at 87.
5. Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal.2d 263, 280, 419 P.2d 168, 179, 54 Cal.Rptr. 104,
115, (1966).
6. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 9 Cal. App. 3d 508, 527-28,
88 Cal. Rptr. 246, 258 (1970). This is true even under a contract theory of recovery, since
the liability policy relates to matters concerning personal welfare. Id.
7. See Mallen, Insurance Counsel: The Fine Line Between Professional Responsibility and
Malpractice, 45 INS. CouNs. J. 244, 245 (1978) (the insurance contract expressly empowers
the insurer to select the attorney who will defend the insured).
8. See generally American Mut. Liability Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 38 Cal. App. 3d
579, 590-93, 113 Cal. Rptr. 561, 570-72 (1974) (explaining the tripartite relationship).
9. See Alsobrook, Conflicts Between Insurer and Insured, 48 INs. CouNs. J. 165 (1981);
Note, Conflicts of Interests: Insurance Cases, 55 A.B.A. J. 262 (1969).
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policy, a finding that the insured intentionally assaulted the third party
excludes coverage. This situation benefits the insurer at the expense
of the insured by relieving liability under the policy.' 0
Out of concern that a coverage issue might influence the conduct
of defense counsel in the original third party suit because of the finan-
cial interests of the insurer, several California courts have implied
that the insured has the right to select independent counsel when a
coverage issue exists. ' This right was expressly recognized by the
California Court of Appeal for the Fourth District in San Diego Navy
Federal Credit Union v. Cumis Insurance Society.'2 The Cumis court
held that when a coverage issue exists, the insured is entitled to private
counsel at the expense of the insurer."
The Cumis decision has had an adverse effect on the much troubled
liability insurance industry." With a substantial percentage of premium
dollars already spent on defense, insurers are having difficulty asser-
ting legitimate coverage defenses because the cost of doing so is too
high.'" Increasing litigation costs not only inhibit insurers from pro-
tecting their own interests, but also pose a detriment to the public.' 6
Rising defense costs often compel the insurer to extend coverage
because asserting a coverage position adverse to the insured is too
expensive. 7 At face value, this situation might seem just because more
10. See KEETON, supra note 2, §5.4(b) at 291. The central idea of insurance is that coverage
is extended for fortuitous losses only. Id. Consequently, coverage for intentionally caused harm
has been denied under liability insurance policy provisions including the phrase "caused by
accident" in the basic definition of coverage. Id. at 293. See also CAL. INS. CODE §533; Ford
Motor Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 116 Cal. App. 3d 374, 382, 172 Cal. Rptr. 59, 64 (1981).
11. See, e.g., Previews v. Cal. Union Ins., 640 F.2d 1026, 1028 (9th Cir. 1981), Executive
Aviation, Inc. v. National Ins. Underwriters, 16 Cal. App. 3d 799, 810, 94 Cal. Rptr. 347,
354 (1971). But see Zieman Mfg. Co. v. St. Paul Marine Ins. Co., 724 F.2d 1343, 1346 (9th
Cir. 1983) (holding that similar circumstances do not automatically create a conflict of interest).
12. 162 Cal. App. 3d 358, 208 Cal. Rptr. 494 (1984).
13. Id. at 375, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 506.
14. Insurers paid out from $135 to S160 for every $100 of premium income taken in 1984.
Andresky, A World Without Insurance?, FORBES, July 15, 1985, at 40, 43. To avoid this loss,
the liability carrier is forced to either raise rates or leave the business. The result to the con-
sumer is often sharply reduced coverage at a vastly higher cost. Id. at 42-43. A major factor
contributing to the financial woes of liability insurers is the growing number of huge persgnal
injury awards. Unanticipated liabilities have also appeared such as exposure to asbestos and
leaking toxic waste dumps. Insurance: Now It's a Risky Business, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 4, 1985,
at 48, 49.
15. See infra notes 88-119 and accompanying text (explaining cost-related problems associated
with the right to private counsel).
16. Inevitably, increased costs of insurers result in increased costs to insureds. See Morris,
supra note 3 at 460; Browne, The Demise of the Declaratory Judgment Action as a Device
for Testing the Insurer's Duty to Defend: A Postscript, 24 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 18, 25-26 (1974).
17. Berg, After Cumis: Regaining Control of the Defense, FOR THE DEFENSE, August,
1985, at 13-14.
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people receive coverage. As a result, however, many people and en-
tities are not able to obtain liability insurance because the costs of
obtaining the insurance are too high. 8
This comment will explore the duty to defend' 9 and situations giving
rise to conflicts of interest." Next, the impact of the Cumis2' deci-
sion on liability carriers will be discussed." Finally, this comment will
determine whether independent counsel is necessary in all situations
presenting potential diversity of interests. This comment will conclude
that actual adversity should be the standard to trigger the right to
private counsel because a reduction in the use of private counsel will
lower costs for both insurer and insured without sacrificing the in-
terests of either. 3
THE DUTY To DEIFEND
Most liability policies provide that an insurance carrier has both
the right and the duty to defend the insured .2  The insurer retains
18. The problem of soaring insurance costs has been felt in many areas of society, but
particularly where risks of litigation are great. Cities and municipalities must curb services and
boost taxes, or go without liability coverage altogether. Insurance Shock: Premiums Up, Coverage
Down, TImE, Sept. 16, 1985, at 55. Doctors, such as obstetricians plagued by wrongful birth
claims, are switching to less risky specialties because malpractice premiums run as high as $72,000
a year. Id. Lawyer malpractice rates have increased 900 percent since 1984, with many firms
having to finance the annual premium. Liability Insurance Crisis in Full Bloom, 29 RES GESTA
22 (1985). Liability to third parties has made accountants vulnerable to extremely high premiums.
Andresky, supra note 14, at 40. The rise in product-liability lawsuits, notably in the case of
the Dalkon Shield, has ballooned insurance costs for manufacturers. Insurance Shock: Premiums
Up, Coverage Down, TIME, Sept. 16, 1985, at 55, 56. Toxic pollution insurance is almost im-
possible to obtain since the Union Carbide disaster in Bhopal. Id. Liquor stores have been
denied coverage because they sometimes have been found liable for death and injury caused
by drunken customers. Id. The recent string of large-scale air disasters has produced huge premium
increases for the airline industry. Id. The huge increase in public awareness about child abuse
has made day care centers virtually uninsurable. Day Care Becomes High Risk, TimE, June
3, 1985, at 62. New companies are experiencing difficulty assembling boards of directors because
of the hardship involved in obtaining directors' and officers' insurance. Insurance: Now It's
a Risky Business, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 4, 1985, at 48, 49.
19. See infra notes 24-52 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 53-67 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 68-137 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 138-186 alid accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 187-189 and accompanying text.
24. A. WNnT, INSURANCE CLAn s AND DispuTEs, §4.30 at 101 (1982). A typical duty to
defend clause reads:
... the company shall have the right and the duty to defend any suit against the in-
sured seeking damages on account of such bodily injury or property damage, ... and
may make such investigation and settlement of any claim or suit as it deems expe-
dient, but the company will not be obligated to pay any claim or judgment or to
defend any suit after the applicable limit of the policy has been exhausted by pay-
ment of judgments or settlements.
KEETON, supra note 2, at 658.
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exclusive control over litigation involving the insured to permit orderly
disbursement of monies accumulated from premiums.25 False claims
are also minimized because the carrier is involved in the details of
the litigation.26 Ultimately, however, the insurer is interested in con-
trolling lawsuits against the insured because the insurer may be liable
for losses suffered by the insured.27
In California, the duty to defend is not coextensive with the duty
to indemnify2" the insured. Often, the duty to defend will arise when
no duty to indemnify exists. The landmark case of Gray v. Zurich
Insurance Company" defined the duty to defend in California by
holding that the insurance carrier is obligated to defend an action
if the claim alleged is potentially within the coverage of the insurance
policy."
Gray involved an action by an insured against his insurance carrier
for failure to defend an assault complaint.3' The initial suit arose out
of a fight between Gray, the defendant, and Jones, the plaintiff."
Jones filed a complaint alleging that Gray intentionally assaulted him."
Gray, stating that he acted in self-defense, asked the insurance carrier
to defend."' The carrier refused, stating that the complaint alleged
an intentional tort, which was excluded from coverage.35 The court
in Gray found that the carrier had attempted to avoid the policy by
employing unclear policy language for the intentional acts exclusion .
6
Invoking the reasonable expectation rule, the court said that the car-
rier should have defended since Jones' allegations of intentional in-
juries could potentially be decided under a negligence theory and thus
be within policy coverage.3"
25. 7C J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE §4681, at 2 (1980).
26. Id.
27. King, Zeavin, & Snyder, The Insurer's Duty to Defend, 6 Civ. LmOATION REP. 173,
178 (California Continuing Education of the Bar) (1984).
28. The basic aspect of the principle of indemnity is the transfer of loss from an insured
to an insurer by means of an obligation upon the insurer to confer an offsetting benefit. KEEToN,
supra note 2, §3.1(a) at 88. The value of the benefit (the policy proceeds) shall not exceed
the loss because reimbursement is the ultimate goal of indemnity. Id. This does not imply,
however, that the. benefit be no less than the loss. Id.
29. 65 Cal.2d 263, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104, 419 P.2d 168 (1966).
30. Id. at 275, 54 Cal. Rptr. 'at 112, 419 P.2d at 176.
31. Id. at 266, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 105, 419 P.2d at 169.




36. Id. at 268, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 107, 419 P.2d at 171.
37. Id. at 275-76, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 112, 419 P.2d at 176.
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The general rule, overruled in Gray, was that the specific allega-
tions of the complaint determine the duty to defend.38 Considering
the likely overstatement in the complaint and the liberality of modern
pleading rules, the Gray court feared the third party being the "arbiter"
of insurance coverage.3 9 Further, the court reasoned that since no one
can determine at the outset of trial whether the third party suit falls
within coverage, that issue will not be resolved until after adjudica-
tion of the third party suit."0 Thus, if an insurer finds the injury caused
by the insured has the potential to fall within coverage, the insurer
is obliged to defend even if the complaint contains allegations to the
contrary.'
Since the duty to defend is a contractually imposed duty, 2 the fulfill-
ment of that duty must be in good faith because of the covenant
of good faith and fair dealing implied in every contract. 3 This cove-
nant requires that each contracting party shall not do anything to
injure the right of the other party to receive the benefits of the con-
tractual agreement." In the insurance context, the covenant of good
faith means that the insurer must give the interests of insurer and
insured equal consideration. 5
Consequences of breaching the duty to defend are often severe. 6
A wrongful refusal to defend by the insurer may in itself result in
38. See Maxon v. Security Ins. Co., 214 Cal. App. 2d 603, 616-17, 29 Cal. Rptr. 586,
593-94 (1963).
39. Gray, 65 Cal.2d at 276, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 112, 419 P.2d at 176.
40. Id. at 271-72, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 109, 419 P.2d at 173.
41. See Mullen v. Glen Falls Ins. Co., 73 Cal. App. 3d 163, 170, 140 Cal. Rptr. 605,
609 (1977) (the court examined whether the insurance carrier possessed sufficient factual infor-
mation to determine whether the potential for liability existed). The insurer must consider in-
formation from all sources, including investigation of the facts surrounding the claim that could
alert the insurer to possible defenses of the insured. Gray, 65 Cal. 2d at 276, 54 Cal. Rptr.
at 112, 419 P.2d at 176. The duty of the carrier to investigate is codified by defining as an
unfair practice the failure to adopt and implement reasonable standards for the prompt in-
vestigation of claims. CAL. INs. CODE §790.03(h)(3). Courts and commentators have criticized
the Gray rule. See, e.g., Burd v. Sussex Mut. Ins. Co., 267 A.2d 7, 12 (N.J. 1970); Note,
The Insurer's Duty to Defend Made Absolute: Gray v. Zurich, 14 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1328,
1337-39 (1967).
42. KEETON, supra note 2, §7.6(a) at 462.
43. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS §205 (1979); Burton, Breach of Contract
and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good Faith, 94 HARV. L. REv. 369, 404 (1980)
(listing jurisdictions that imply a covenant of good faith in every contract). See, e.g., Com-
unale v. Traders & General Ins. Co., 50 Cal.2d 654, 658, 328 P.2d 198, 201 (1958); Crisci
v. Security Ins. Co. 66 Cal.2d 425, 429, 426 P.2d 173, 176, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13, 16 (1967).
44. 1 WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW (8th ed. 1973) Contracts, §576, at 493.
45. J. APPLEMAN, supra note 25, §46.87, at 179. See, e.g., Betts v. Allstate Ins., 154 Cal.
App. 3d 688, 716, 201 Cal. Rptr. 528, 545 (1984); Lysick v. Walcom, 258 Cal. App. 2d 136,
146, 65 Cal. Rptr. 406, 413 (1968).
46. See generally KEETON, supra note 2, §7.6(e) at 484-89 (discussion of wrongful failure
to defend).
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a finding of bad faith against the insurer, 47 or may remove the in-
surer from the settlement process, thus setting the stage for a finding
of bad. faith. 4 The insurer that refuses to defend a claim, does so
at its own risk and becomes liable for all resulting damage to the
insured. 49 The insurer can be liable to the insured for the amount
ofethe judgment in excess of the policy limits,50 as well as attorneys'
fees.' Damages for pain and suffering, economic loss, and punitive
damages are also available to the insured under the appropriate factual
circumstances. 51
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
Since the carrier may be required to defend an action for which
it might not be held liable,53 many courts and commentators have
47. Jarchow v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 48 Cal. App. 3d 917, 940-42, 122 Cal. Rptr.
470, 486-88 (1975).
48. Samson v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 30 Cal. 3d 220, 239, 636 P.2d 32, 44, 178
Cal. Rptr. 343, 355 (1981); State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 9 Cal. App.
3d 508, 530-31, 88 Cal. Rptr. 246, 260 (1970).
49. Chicken Delight, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 35 Cal. App. 3d 841, 849,
111 Cal. Rptr. 79, 84 (1973).
50. Gray, 65 Cal. 2d at 280, 419 P.2d at 179, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 115. The insurer who wrong-
fully refuses to defend is generally liable on the judgment against the insured even when that
judgment exceeds the policy limits. Id. In holding that the insurer who wrongfully refuses to
defend is generally liable on the judgment against the insured, the Gray court applied the con-
tract theory of recovery used in Tomerlin v. Canadian Indemnity Co., 61 Cal. 2d 638, 394
P.2d 571, 39 Cal. Rptr. 731 (1964). A wrongful refusal to defend constitutes a breach of the
insurance contract. Gray, 65 Cal. 2d at 280, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 115, 419 P.2d at 179.
51. Brandt v. Standard Ins. Co., 37 Cal. 3d 813, 819, 693 P.2d 796, 800, 210 Cal. Rptr.
211, 215 (1985). Only those fees that are incurred in the course of attempting to obtain policy
benefits are recoverable. Id. Fees attributable to obtaining any portion of the plaintiff's award
that exceeds the amount due under the policy are not recoverable. rd.
52. The courts have held that under the appropriate factual circumstances, an insurer who
breaches the duty to defend may be held liable for pain and emotional distress caused to the
insured. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 9 Cal. App. 3d 508, 528, 88
Cal. Rptr. 246, 258 (1970). New ground was broken in this area by the decision in Crisci
v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967). The court in Crisci
stated that the general rule of damages in tort is that the injured party may recover for all
detriment incurred whether it could have been anticipated or not. Id. at 433-34, 426 P.2d at
179, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 19. The right to recover for mental suffering is included when it con-
stitutes an aggravation of damages. Id. Although the case did not include a claim for physical
injuries, the court believed the property damage involved apart from the mental distress was
substantial, thereby reducing the risk of a fictitious claim. Id. Loss of earnings and other economic
losses are also recoverable since they naturally flow from the act of bad faith. See id. Califor-
nia courts have also held that punitive damages may be awarded in appropriate cases. See
e.g. Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 809, 820, 598 P.2d 452, 457, 157 Cal.
Rptr. 482, 487 (1979); Richardson v. Employers Liab. Assur. Corp., 25 Cal. App. 3d 232,
244-46, 102 Cal. Rptr. 547, 555-57 (1972). Some form of conscious wrongdoing is required
for an award of punitive damages. CAL. Civ. CODE §3294(a) provides: "...where the defendant
has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in addition to actual damages,
may recover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant."
53. If the plaintiff in the underlying suit alleges both covered and non-covered conduct,
1426
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feared a less than competent defense by retained counsel of the in-
surer 4.5  Typically, in tort actions, the injured party will claim that
the injuries were either intentionally or negligently inflicted. 5 The
liability policy will not usually cover intentional torts. 6 Thus, the in-
terest of the insurer would be served by a finding that the insured
engaged in intentional conduct.57 This result, however, leaves the in-
sured without coverage and the plaintiff uncompensated if the insured
is insolvent.5 8 Because the insurer pays the fees of the defense counsel,
many fear that defense counsel could slant efforts in favor of the
insurer."s
Upon assumption of the defense of the insured, the insurer is
estopped from later denying coverage if rights under the policy are
not reserved.60 In California, because the duty to defend is invoked
by the mere existence of potential liability, 61 the carrier can accept
the defense of an action brought against the insured while reserving
the right to contest indemnification issues by using a reservation of
the insurer must defend because the possibility of liability exists. See Gray, 65 Cal.2d at 275,
419 P.2d at 176, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 112. If the noncovered conduct is proven, the insurer has
defended without ultimate liability. Id.
54. See Purdy v. Pacific Auto Ins. Co., 157 Cal. App. 3d 59, 76, 203 Cal. Rptr. 524,
534 (1984); Spindle v. Chubb/Pacific Indemnity Group, 89 Cal. App. 3d 706, 713 152 Cal.
Rptr. 776, 780-81 (1979); Industrial Indemnity Co. v. Great American Ins. Co., 73 Cal. App.
3d 529, 140 Cal. Rptr. 806 (1977); Executive Aviation, Inc. v. National Ins. Underwriters,
16 Cal. App. 3d 799, 94 Cal. Rptr. 347 (1971); Alsobrook, supra note 9 at 167; Note, supra
note 9 at 262; Comment, supra note 3 at 736-740.
55. The complainant in the third party action drafts the complaint in the broadest terms
available. Gray, 65 Cal.2d at 276, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 112, 419 P.2d at 176.
56. Keeton, supra note 2, §5.4(b) at 291.
57. Morris, supra note 3, at 485.
58. Id. See generally KEETON, supra note 2, §7.7(a); Morris, supra note 3, at 466-493 (descrip-
tions of other sources of conflict).
59. See Purdy v. Pacific Automobile Ins. Co., 157 Cal. App. 3d 59, 76, 203 Cal. Rptr.
524, 530 (1984); "The 'triangular' aspect of the representation afforded by the insurer's lawyers
is described as a coalition for a common purpose, a favorable disposition of the claim, with
the attorney owing duties to two clients. As a practical matter, however, there has been recognition
that, in reality, the insurer's attorneys may have closer ties to the insurer and a.more compel-
ling interest in protecting the insurer's position, whether or not it coincides with what is best
for the insured." Id. The Purdy court and others fail to emphasize that the conflict of interest
problem is reciprocal. Conceivably, independent counsel can slant the defense so as to establish
coverage to the detriment of the insurer in a coverage dispute. See Browne, supra note 16, at 24.
60. Tomerlin v. Canadian Indem. Co., 61 Cal. 2d 638, 647, 394 P.2d 571, 577, 39 Cal.
Rptr. 731, 737 (1964). Withdrawal of the reservation of rights letter is in effect a promise
by the insurer to pay any judgment rendered. See id. In California, the theory that an insurer
waives the right to contest coverage by defending the suit is based upon the doctrine of estoppel.
The insured must show that the insurer either intentionally relinquished a known right or acted
in a manner that caused the insured to reasonably believe the insurer had relinquished the
right, and that the insured relied upon the conduct of the carrier to the detriment of the in-
sured. Val's Painting & Drywall, Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 53 Cal. App. 3d 576, 587, 126
Cal. Rptr. 267, 273 (1976).
61. Gray, 65 Cal. 2d at 276, 419 P.2d at 176, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 112.
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rights agreement.62 The reservation of rights by the insurer accents
the potential of a less than competent defense by the carrier."
In response, the courts have required the insurer to use due care
and good faith in the defense of the insured. 64 Although defense
counsel has the duty to act with complete fidelity to the insured,6 5
apprehension exists over the longstanding ties between defense counsel
and insurer.66 Believing that these ties could influence conduct in the
case, several California courts have suggested strongly that a coverage
issue presents a conflict sufficient to allow the insured the absolute
right to private counsel.67
SAN DIEGO NAVY FEDERAL CREDIT UNION V.
CUMIS INSURANCE SOCIETY
In Cumis, the insured was sued for wrongful discharge. 68 In addi-
tion to $750,000 in compensatory damages, the plaintiff sought $6.5
million in punitive damages,69 which are not subject to insurance
coverage in California for public policy reasons.7 The insurer believed
62. A typical reservation of rights letter reads:
This company will provide a defense for you as per the terms of the insurance policy,
but this company does not waive any of its rights under the terms, conditions, and
provisions of the insurance policy. Therefore, if a judgment is entered against you
for damages that are not covered under the policy, this company will not be respon-
sible for the judgment.
G. COUCH ON INSURANCE, §51.78 at 565-66 (2d Rev. ed. 1982). See generally Comment, Reser-
vation of Rights Notices and Nonwaiver Agreements, 12 PAC. L.J. 763 (1981); Comment, supra
note 3 at 745-6. One court has held that the insurer must have the approval of the insured
to retain a reservation of rights. Cumis, 162 Cal. App. 3d at 375, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 506. This
rationale seems unwarranted since a reservation letter is not a bilateral contract, but a unilateral
notice sent by the insurer to the insured informing the insured of the intent of the insurer
to maintain control over the defense and of the belief that the insurer has no obligation to
indemnify the insured. Val's Painting & Drywall, Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 53 Cal. App. 3d
576, 586, 126 Cal. Rptr. 267, 272 (1975). See Note, Liability Insurance Policy Defenses and
the Duty to Defend, 68 HARV. L. Rav. 1436, 1446-7 (1955). Several jurisdictions hold that
the assumption of the defense by the insurer when the insured has refused to sign a reservation
letter is not a waiver of the right of the insurer to bring a declaratory action to determine
coverage. See, e.g., Great Southwest Fire Ins. Co. v. H.V. Corp., 658 P.2d 337, 340 (Hawaii
1983); Sussex Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hala Cleaners, 380 A.2d 693, 697 (N.J. 1977); Boode v. Allied
Mut. Ins. Co. 458 P.2d 653, 659 (Wyo. 1969).
63. Comment, supra note 3, at 745-6.
64. See, e.g., Betts v. Allstate Ins. Co., 154 Cal. App. 3d 688, 715-16, 201 Cal. Rptr.
528, 544-45 (1984); Lysick v. Walcom, 258 Cal. App. 2d 136, 146, 65 Cal. Rptr. 406, 413 (1968).
65. See Mallen, supra note 7, at 246-48.
66. See Purdy v. Pacific Auto. Ins. Co., 157 Cal. App. 3d 59, 76, 203 Cal Rptr. 406,
413 (1984).
67. See, e.g., Previews v. Cal. Union Ins., 640 F.2d 1026, 1028 (9th Cir. 1984); Executive
Aviation, Inc. v. National Ins. Underwriters, 16 Cal. App. 3d 799, 810, 94 Cal. Rptr. 347,
354 (1971).
68. Cumis, 162 Cal. App. 3d at 361, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 496.
69. Id.
70. CAL. CIV. CODE §3294; CAL. INS. CODE §§250, 533; City Products Corp. v. Globe
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that the alleged breach of the employment contract by the defendant
employer was exempted from coverage under the policy.7' When the
conflict of interest issue was raised initially, defense counsel conclud-
ed that no conflict existed.7" Consequently, the insurer refused to pay
for independent counsel and defended the action under reservation
with standard defense counsel."
In sweeping language, the California appellate court held that when
the action against the insured presents claims that might not be covered
under the policy, the insured has the right to select independent counsel
at the expense of the insurer.74 In short, a conflict of interest triggers
the absolute right of the insured to private counsel." The court re-
jected the argument of the insurer that the duty to defend was met
when counsel was retained at the expense of the insurer.'
The insurer, contending that Gray v. Zurich Ins." controlled, rea-
soned that no conflict existed because a carrier is bound ethically and
legally to protect the interest of the insured."' The court in Cumis
responded by stating that "the dictum in Gray flies in the face of
the reality of insurance defense work."" Since the attorney of the
insurer has closer ties to the insurer, the Cumis court was concerned
that the attorney would have a more compelling interest in protecting
the position of the insurer.10
The insurer countered with the Gray reasoning that the coverage
issue is not litigated in the third-party suit.8 Further, if a reservation
of rights letter had been issued, the carrier would not be bound by
Indemnity, 88 Cal. App. 3d 31, 42, 151 Cal. Rptr. 494, 500-01 (1979). The prime objective
of this policy is punishment of wrongdoers. Countervailing interests favoring compensation
of victims may prompt coverage for compensatory damages awarded for precisely the same
conduct. KEETON, supra note 2, §5.3(0 at 288.
71. Cumis, 162 Cal. App. 3d at 362, 208 Cal Rptr. at 496.
72. Id. at 363, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 497.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 375, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 506. Apparently the Cumis rationale does not apply
when the coverage defense does not involve facts in the tort action. An example of such a
defense would be a claim that the policy was void for nonpayment of premiums. Berg, supra
note 17, at 14. One case has limited the holding of Cumis to the facts of the case decided,
"notwithstanding the use of overly broad language by the court...." McGee v. Superior Court,
176 Cal. App. 3d 221, 226, 221 Cal. Rptr. 421, 423 (1985).
75. Cumis, 162 Cal. App. 3d 375, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 506.
76. Id. at 367, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 500.
77. 65 Cal. 2d 263, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104, 419 P.2d 168 (1966). See supra notes 28-41 and
accompanying text (for a discussion of the Gray decision).
78. Cumis, 162 Cal. App. 3d at 368, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 501. See Gray, 65 Cal.2d at 279,
54 Cal. Rptr. at 114, 419 P.2d at 178, n.18.
79. Cumis, 162 Cal. App. 3d at 368, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 498 (quoting the trial court).
80. Id. at n.3 (quoting Purdy v. Pacific Auto. Ins. Co., 157 Cal. App. 3d 59, 76, 203
Cal. Rptr. 524, 534 (1984)).
81. Id. at 368, 208 Cal Rptr. at 501. The only question litigated is the liability of the
insured. Gray, 65 Cal. 2d at 279, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 114, 419 P.2d at 178.
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the judgment in the third-party suit.8" Thus, the interests of the in-
surer and insured are identical in the primary suit since the insurer
could raise the coverage defense later.83 The Cumis court rejected the
reasoning of the insurer by assuming that defense counsel might not
try to minimize the liability of the insured.84 The court conceded that
issues of coverage under the policy are not actually litigated in the
third- party suit,8" but reasoned that this point did not detract from
the force of the opposing interests operating on the attorney selected
by the insurer.
86
PROBLEMS PRESENTED BY THE RIGHT TO INDEPENDENT COUNSEL
The right of the insured to select independent counsel has been
detrimental to several facets of the liability insurance industry. 7 Often,
insurers cannot raise coverage defenses because doing so is not cost-
effective.88 The dramatic sway in control of the defense given to the
insured has contributed to spiraling costs for both carriers and those
buying liability policies.8 9 These problems and others presented by
the Cumis decision accentuate the need for a new solution to the con-
flicts of interest dilemma.
82. Cumis, 162 Cal. App. 3d at 367, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 500. If the injured party prevails,
that party or the insured will assert the claim against the insurer. Then, the insurer can assert
the coverage defense. Gray, 65 Cal. 2d at 279, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 114, 419 P.2d at 178. See
CAL. INs. CODE §1t580(b)(2) which provides in pertinent part: "whenever judgment is secured
against the insured...in an action based upon bodily injury, death, or property damage, then
an action may be brought against the insurer on the policy and subject to its terms and limita-
tions, by such judgment creditor to recover on the judgment."
83. See Gray, 65 Cal. 2d at 279, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 114, 419 P.2d at 178. The insurer and
the insured both seek to avoid, or at least minimize the judgment. Id.
84. Cumis, 162 Cal. App. 3d at 363-64, 368, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 497-98, 501. The court
stated Gray was not controlling because the question of whether the scope of the duty to de-
fend includes payment for independent counsel was not addressed in that case. Id. at 368,
208 Cal. Rptr. at 501.
85. Id. at 364, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 498.
86. Id. The court emphasized the dual agency status of the attorney retained by the in-
surer and rejected the idea that the insured consents to this status by contracting with the
insurer. Id. at 365, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 498. Any consent by the insured was deemed waived
by the court when the insured hired independent counsel. See Lysick v. Walcom, 258 Cal.
App. 2d 136, 146, 65 Cal. Rptr. 496, 503 (1968). The insured may waive or otherwise forego
the right to independent counsel. McGee v. Superior Court, 176 Cal. App. 3d 221, 227, 221
Cal. Rptr. 421, 424 (1985). The right to independent counsel was expressly stated by the Cumis
court to be a right belonging to the insured, not the adversary of the insured. Id. at 228.
87. Berg, supra note 17, at 13-14.
88. Id.
89. Id. Large judgment awards, expanded liability theories, and the joint and several liability
rule are other contributing factors. See generally Comment, Extending MICRA Liability Limita-
tions To All Negligence Actions: The Case For Tort Reform, 17 PAC. L.J. 553, 553-57 (1986)
(for a detailed discussion of this dilemma). See also supra notes 14-18 and accompanying text
(for a general discussion of the insurance crisis).
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A. Defense Costs and Handling 6f Claims
The cost of defending an action often exceeds the potential
recovery.9" This situation coerces the carrier to settle, even if the case
has little merit.9' Currently, even though punitive damage claims are
not subject to coverage, 92 claims for punitive damages are often in-
cluded by plaintiffs to create a conflict of interest and force the in-
surer to pay for private counsel. 93 The inclusion of non-covered claims
in the pleadings can put pressure on the insurer to settle.94 Defense
costs can increase at an astonishing rate, 95 and the ability of the in-
surer to restrain these costs may be limited due to the threat of a
bad faith action by the insured. 96 Failing to respond in timely fashion
to demands or inquiries of the insured is the most common way for
the insurer to provide a factual basis for a bad faith claim. 97 This
type of behavior is easily recognized by a jury, and is difficult, if
not impossible, to justify.9" Thus, the insurer and retained counsel
must take all steps necessary to respond to these demands or face
additional costs resulting from bad faith litigation.99
Cumis mandates that the insurer pay the reasonable costs of hiring
independent counsel incurred by the insured.' 0 The costs considered
reasonable for the insurer often differ from those considered reasonable
for independent counsel.' Private rates may be higher in comparison
90. Berg, supra note 17, at 13-14.
91. Id.
92. City Products Corp. v. Globe Indem., 88 Cal. App. 3d 31, 42, 151 Cal. Rptr. 494,
500-02 (1979).
93. See Berg, supra note 17, at 14. Punitive damages do not create a coverage issue since
they are not subject to coverage. An award of punitive damages still benefits the insurer while
hurting the insured because of this coverage exemption. Hence, the interests of insurer and
insured are in conflict. See supra notes 53-67 and accompanying text (for a discussion of con-
flicts of interest).
94. See Berg, supra note 17, at 14.
15. The rate of increase can rise geometrically in a situation with multiple defendants,
since each will be entitled to private counsel. For instance, in an action with five defendants,
the insurer might have to pay $100,000 with a standard defense counsel. After each defendant
secures private counsel, costs can jump to $500,000 and beyond. Id.
96. Even when the insurer assumes the defense and ultimately settles the third party claim
for an amount within the policy limits, a possibility for tort liability exists on the basis of
bad faith of the insurer in conduct of the defense. See SHERNOFF, GAGE & LEVINE, INSURANCE
BAD FAITH LITIGATION, §3.25(2) (1984). Most courts that have been called on to define bad
faith have usually done so in terms of the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the action
of the carrier. Thus, insurers are required to act reasonably to carry out the agreed purpose
of the contract. LePley, Bad Faith Updated: Definitions and Defenses, 21 TRIAL 46-47 (1985).
97. Ashley, Counsel's Role in Avoiding Bad Faith Exposure, BAD FAITH INSURANCE LITIGA-
TION (California Continuing Education of the Bar) 73, 77-78 (1985).
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Cumis, 162 Cal. App. 3d at 375, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 506.
101. Berg, supra note 17, at 15; Browne, supra note 16, at 25-26. Since insurers are not
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since standard defense counsel are accustomed to handling insurance
defense cases and can therefore charge lower fees.' 2 Further, the
amount of business generated by the insurer for standard counsel allows
the demand of lower rates.' 3 The defense bar is to a certain extent
dependent on the insurance industry for continued business, constrain-
ing law firms to keep legal fees as low as possible to obtain that
business.' 4 Independent counsel of the insured is under no such con-
straint. 10 5
B. Expertise of Private Counsel
Insurers also lack any method of screening the qualifications of
independent counsel.'" The carrier not only has a duty to defend
but also a right.' 7 Private counsel might not always adequately pro-
tect this right due to lack of experience or expertise in the area of
defense.' 8 Skilled in particular areas of advocacy, standard defense
counsel are generally better prepared than the average attorney to de-
fend the insured effectively. 0 9 Further, insurers have experience in
selecting attorneys, which is particularly important in complex litiga-
tion."' An uninformed choice by the insured may result in higher
judgments and settlements."' Consequently, the insured may be denied
the opportunity to the most effective defense available, which ultimately
is why the right to private counsel is provided." 2
thought to be impoverished, a "reasonable" fee is likely to be higher than that ordinarily charged
by the retained counsel of the insurer. Browne, supra note 16, at 25.
102. Berg, supra note 17, at 15. An increased cost can result from want of skill and
experience. Independent counsel may need more time to perform work that an experienced
counsel could perform with greater dispatch as a matter of routine. Browne, supra note 16, at 26.
103. See Mallen, supra note 7, at 245.
104. Browne, supra note 16, at 25.
105. Id.
106. The lay insured will often make a poor choice of counsel. Id. This is often due to
concern over legal expenses. See Fager, Insured's Right to Independent Counsel in Conflicts
of Interest Situations, 48 INS. CoUNs. J. 160, 161 (1981).
107. A. WrNDT, supra note 24, §4.30 at 101.
108. Browne, supra note 16, at 25; Note, supra note 62, at 144243.
109. Note, supra note 62, at 1442-43.
110. Morris, supra note 3, at 477.
Ill. Id., at 466.
112. See Spindle v. Chubb/Pacific Indemnity Group, 89 Cal. App. 3d 706, 712, 152 Cal.
Rptr. 776, 780 (1979). Conflict occurs when representation of one client by standard defense
counsel is rendered less effective by representation of the other. Id. The Cumis court applied
the reciprocal reasoning that dual representation is rendered less effective when conflict occurs.
Cumis, 162 Cal. App. 3d at 365, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 498.
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C. Settlement Information
As with defense counsel retained by the insurer, the independent
counsel has an obligation not to disclose information that would
adversely affect the client in the dispute over coverage." 3 The insurer,
however, has an obligation to settle cases in which liablility becomes
reasonably clear." 4 Because private counsel often will not disclose all
facts necessary for the evaluation of liability and damages, the in-
surer may not be able to make a proper decision as to settlement." 5
Thus, the carrier often must make such decisions based upon inade-
quate information." 6 Refusal to settle can bring about the possibility
of a bad faith action.' 7 Counsel retained by the insurer can keep
the carrier informed as to the prospects of liability without prejudice
to the insured, thus allowing the insurer to make prudent settlement
decisions. I I I
The inherent problems of conflicts of interest in liability insurance
have been outlined above. Since the problem has been resolved against
the insurer, two approaches to minimize losses are presented. The
first is long term, involving prospective changes in the insurance policy.
113. The attorney can never advise the insurer as to coverage issues between insurer and
insured. This would violate Canon 5 of the Model Code of Professional Respnsibility which
states, "A Lawyer Should Exercise Professional Judgment on Behalf of a Client." MODEL CODE
OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONsIBILITY Canon 5 (1979). The attorney is also obligated to respect the
confidence of the client and to not disclose to the carrier any facts that might vitiate coverage.
Any such disclosure would be clear violation of Canon 4 of the Code of Professional Respon-
sibility which states, "A Lawyer Should Preserve the Confidence and Secrets of a Client."
Id. Canon 4. See Weithers, The Coverage Role of Defense Counsel, 48 INs. CoUrs. J. 156 (1981).
114. CAL. INs. CODE §790.03(h)(5). See Royal Globe Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 23 Cal. 3d
880, 884, 592 P.2d 329, 332, 153 Cal. Rptr. 842, 845 (holding that a third party claimant
may sue an insurer for violating Insurance Code §790.03(h)(5)).
115. Berg, supra note 17, at 14-15.
116. Id.
117. The California Supreme Court has stated that the test whether an insurer has acted
in bad faith in refusing a settlement offer is "whether a prudent insurer without policy limits
would have accepted the offer." Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 429, 426 P.2d
173, 175, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13, 15 (1967). But see Johansen v. California State Automobile Assoc.
Inter-Insurance Bureau, 15 Cal. 3d 9, 538 P.2d 744, 123 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1975). The only per-
missible consideration in evaluating the reasonableness of the settlement offer is whether the
ultimate judgment is likely to exceed the amount of the settlement offer. Id. at 16, 538 P.2d
at 748, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 292. The size of the judgment recovered exceeding the policy limits
furnishes an inference that the value of the claim is the equivalent of the amount of the judg-
ment and that acceptance of an offer within those limits was the most reasonable method of
dealing with the claim. Id. at 17, 538 P.2d at 749, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 293. See also Allen,
Insurance Bad Faith Law: The Need for Legislative Intervention, 13 PAC. L.J. 833 (1982);
Note, Insurer's Liability for Refusal to Settle: Beyond Strict Liability, 50 S. CAL. L. Rav.
751 (1977); Kelly, The Workable Sanction and Solution in Excess Liability Cases: Strict Liability
for Insurance Carriers, 10 U.S.F. L. REv. 159 (1975).
118. See generally Keeton, Liability Insurance and Responsibility for Settlement, 67 HARv.
L. REv. 1136 (1954).
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The second is short term, involving the coverage position asserted
by the insurer.
MINDMIzNG LossEs OF Tim INSURER
Changes in the liability insurance policy are one way to alleviate
the problems of the conflict of interest situation.119 Changing the terms
of the insurance policy may, however, prove to be unpredictable in
practice, and may expose the carrier to even higher costs. Further,
these long term changes can only be implemented in the future and
will not affect the present losses of insurers.
A. Elimination of the Duty to Defend
Since the duty to defend is contractual,' ° the simple elimination
of the clause from the insurance policy is an option. The obligation
of the insurer would be limited to paying losses.' Exorbitant costs
of private counsel would be avoided.' 22 Elimination of the duty to
defend, however, would leave the insurer vulnerable. The insured may
not be able to defend the claim effectively, resulting in the carrier
having to pay unduly large judgments.' 3 Moreover, in California,
a statutory duty to defend arises when the policy is silent. 4 Unless
the policy clearly and expressly excludes a duty to defend, California
courts will imply the duty.' 5 Elimination of the duty to defend, even
if feasible, does not necessarily eliminate the duty to settle. 2 6 Lack
of participation in the defense leaves the carrier vulnerable to bad
faith claims because of the difficulty of ascertaining when liability
becomes reasonably clear. 7
119. See CAL. INS. CODE §11580 (required policy provisions).
120. KEETON, supra note 2, §7.6(a) at 462.
121. Berg, supra note 17, at 16.
122. Id.
123. Browne, supra note 16, at 25; Note, supra note 62, at 1442-43.
124. CAL. CIV. CODE §2778(3)-(5). These code sections provide that indemnity against liability
embraces the costs of defense against claims brought against the insured. Id. Hence, if the
parties are under a contract of indemnity, a statutory duty arises requiring the insurer to defend
the insured.
125. See, e.g., Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyds of London,
56 Cal. App. 3d 791, 800, 129 Cal. Rptr. 47, 53 (1976).
126. Since the duty to settle is statutory, a court may be persuaded on public policy grounds
not to allow an insurer to disclaim the duty to settle. See Berg, supra note 17, at 16.
127. Id. See CAL. INS. CODE §790.03(h)(5).
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B. Limits on Defense Costs
Another option would be for the insurance policy to limit what
the insurer will pay in defense costs. When the limit is reached,
however, the problems of questionable defense by the insured and
vulnerability to bad faith actions again are involved.'28 The carrier
could also modify the policy limit to include the cost of defense. As
defense costs rise, the obligation to indemnify decreases. The insured
would be forced to control defense costs, thus minimizing the risk
of an economically coerced settlement.'29
California law on the correlation between the duty to defend and
the duty to indemnify is unclear.130 Whether the duty to defend would
terminate by including defense costs within the policy limits is ques-
tionable, because Gray suggested that the duty to defend is broader
than the duty to indemnify' and a split of authority exists in Califor-
nia as to whether the duty to defend terminates upon exhaustion of
the policy limits. 32 If a court construes the duty to defend as in-
dependent of the duty to indemnify, including defense costs within
the policy limits achieves little.'
33
C. A Short Term Strategy for the Insurer
Even if the policy modifications suggested were viable, their effect
could only be prospective. Thus, any savings accruing to the insurer
could only be realized in the long run. Claims arising under existing
policies must be considered. If the carrier is faced with a possible
conflict, expenses can sometimes be minimized by withdrawing the
reservation of rights letter. This procedure eliminates any possible con-
128. Berg, supra note 17, at 16.
129. Id.
130. See Comment, Termination of the Duty to Defend: Did the California Supreme Court
Send the Wrong Signal?, 17 PAC. L.J. 283, 296-300 (1985).
131. Gray, 65 Cal.2d at 275, 54 Cal. Rptr, at 112, 419 P.2d at 176. This belief is apparently
based on the fact that an insurer must sometimes defend when no duty to indemnify exists.
Also, the insurer may have to defend groundless suits, but is only required to compensate
the insured for actual losses under the policy. See Comment, supra note 130, at 301.
132. Compare Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyds of London,
56 Cal. App. 3d 791, 129 Cal. Rptr. 47 (1976) with Signal Companies v. Harbor Ins. Co.,
27 Cal.3d 359, 612 P.2d 889, 165 Cal. Rptr. 799 (1980). This authority is further clouded
by issues relating to layered insurance coverage and relations between primary and excess in-
surance carriers. See Comment, supra note 130, at 301.
133. See generally Gavin, The Insurance Carrier's Obligation to Defend When Claims Against
the Insured Exceed the Policy Limits, 35 INs. CouNs. J. 92, 94-106 (1968); Montgomery, The
Effect of Exhausting Policy Limits on the Duty of the Insurer to Defend, 1965 INs. L.J. 651
(1965).
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flict, because the insurer has in effect promised to pay any judgment
rendered. 3 " Thus, no private counsel would be necessary.
In certain instances, this alternative may be cost-effective. If the
potential exposure to non-covered claims is small compared to the
savings in defense costs, withdrawal of the reservation letter will save
the insurer money. Further, the threat of enormous defense costs is
avoided, allowing the insurer to litigate more cases fully. Ultimately,
this alternative may result in lower settlements because plaintiffs would
not be able to economically coerce insurers as easily.' 35 By regularly
following this procedure, however, the insurer has in effect forfeited
the right to assert coverage defenses.' 3 6 Insurers have no duty to
sacrifice their own interests when those interests conflict with the in-
terests of the insured.' 37
The balance struck by California courts with regard to conflicts
of interest weighs heavily against insurers. The detriment incurred by
insurers through the mandatory use of private counsel and the lack
of a viable method for insurers to minimize their losses have been
diagrammed. Obviously, this detriment is passed on to insureds through
higher premiums. A new balance is necessary to protect the interests
of insurance carriers adequately while serving the public as well.
RE-EXAMINING CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
Granting an absolute right to private counsel whenever a conflict
exists '3 is an inappropriate solution to the conflicts of interest prob-
lem. The real inquiry should be the effect of the use of counsel re-
tained by the insured on the ultimate resolution of the coverage issue.139
A conflict of interest inheres in every coverage dispute. 140 The in-
surer seeks to minimize loss payments and the insured seeks indem-
134. Tomerlin v. Canadian Indem. Co., 61 Cal. 2d 638, 648, 39 Cal. Rptr. 731, 737, 394
P.2d 571, 577 (1964).
135. See Berg, supra note 17, at 17.
136. See Keeton, supra note 118, at 1170.
137. Id.
138. See Cumis, 162 Cal. App. 3d at 375, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 506. A conflict arises whenever
the insurer takes the view that a coverage issue is present. Id. at 369, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 501.
When a conflict exists, the insured may have control of the defense. Id. at 375, 208 Cal. Rptr.
at 506.
139. See Clemmons v. Travelers Ins. Co., 430 N.E.2d 1104, 1109 (I1. 1981) (holding nothing
that the insurer could do in the underlying suit would affect the later dispute over policy coverage).
140. "A conflict of interest exists when the attorney, or any person represented by the
attorney, has interests adverse in any way to the advice or course of action that should be
available to the present client. A conflict exists when this tension exists even if the attorney
eventually takes the course of action most beneficial to the present client." Aronson, Conflict
of Interest, 52 ,vAsH. L. REV. 807, 809 (1977). See generally H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS, at
104-18 (1953).
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nification.' 4 ' These irreconcilable interests trigger the right to private
counsel every time a coverage dispute exists if the insurer chooses
to defend under reservation. " Mere diversity of interests should not
trigger the right to private counsel. Actual adversity should be the
standard to trigger the right. If counsel retained by the insurer is not
in a position to further the interests of the insurer, considerably less
reason exists for allowing the insured to select private counsel since
little chance of prejudice to the insured exists with respect to
coverage.' 3 Allowing the carrier to retain the attorney selection func-
tion facilitates lower defense costs for the carrier and lower insurance
costs for the insured."' The appropriate standard in the selection of
counsel is influenced by the conduct of retained counsel and the stan-
dard of loyalty.
A. Preventing Coverage Harm to the Insured
The attorney has an obligation not to disclose information volun-
tarily that is adverse to the client, regardless of the source.' 5 This
means defense counsel of the insurer cannot represent the insurer in
a declaratory action against the insured,' 6 nor advise the insurer re-
garding coverage issues.' 7 In the context of a coverage dispute, an
abuse of the attorney-client relationship resulting in denial of coverage
to the insured should constitute a waiver of any policy defense. '
Disciplinary measures' 49 and malpractice liability are possibilities to
deter the attorney from abusing the attorney-client relationship.'50 The
attorney also may be liable for conspiracy to commit an unfair claims
141. The insurer can reduce costs by concentrating on eliminating or reducing the liability
of the insured to third parties, or direct attention to coverage exclusions or limitations in the
policy of the insured. The result, reduced payments, is the same in either case. Only the person
affected differs. Morris, supra note 3, at 460.
142. Cumis, 162 Cal. App. 3d at 369, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 505.
143. See Clemmons v. Travelers Ins. Co., 430 N.E.2d 1104, 1109 (Ill. 1981).
144. Browne, supra note 16, at 25-26.
145. See Mallen, supra note 7, at 246-48. See also MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPON-
SIBILITY, DR 4-101(B)(2)-(3), 7-101(A)(3) (1979).
146. Executive Aviation, Inc. v. Nat. Ins. Underwriters, 16 Cal. App. 3d 799, 809-10, 94
Cal. Rptr. 347, 353-54 (1971).
147. Employers Casualty Co. v. Tilley, 496 S.W.2d 552, 561 (Texas 1973).
148. See id.; Parsons v. Continental National American Group, 550 P.2d 94, 99 (Ariz.
1976). Use of the confidential relationship to gather information so as to deny coverage is
so contrary to public policy that the insurer is estopped from disclaiming liability even when
the defense was conducted subject to a reservation of rights. Id.
149. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBLITY, DR 4-101 (1979).
150. See generally MALLEN & LEvTT, LEGAL MALPRACTICE §§7-8 (West 1977) (discussing
risks of abusing the attorney-client relationship).
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practice.' 5 ' Thus, defense counsel retained by the insurer must ensure
that the information related to coverage issues obtained as a result
of the privileged relationship with the insured is not disclosed to the
insurer.' 
5 1
Conflicts of interest pose many ethical problems for attorneys
engaged in the tripartite insurance defense relationship. California
courts reason that an attorney retained by the carrier is engaged in
a dual representation of insurer and insured, which requires the at-
torney to exercise a high duty of care to both clients.' This stan-
dard promotes conflicts, because defense attorneys are forced to make
decisions in the underlying litigation that may harm one of the in-
terests they are supposed to promote."'
A standard of undivided loyalty to the insured is ethically and con-
tractually mandated. This standard is consistent with the ethical obliga-
tions attorneys owe to clients. Further, the phrase "duty to defend"
does not merit anything less than a full defense just as if the insured
were paying the fees. The troublesome allegiance to two clients is
thereby eliminated, giving a clearer direction to the defense attorney. "
Many cases assume that upon discovery of a policy defense during
representation, the defense counsel can withdraw from the case without
harming the insured.'5 6 This way of dealing with the problem actually
operates as a warning to the insurer to look for a coverage defense."
The undivided loyalty standard can circumvent this thorny problem.
Because defense counsel cannot reveal any information that may be
detrimental to the insured in any subsequent action, no dilemma arises
of whether to continue defending a suit that the insurer may have
no obligation to defend." 8
151. Wolfrich Corp. v. U.S. Auto Assoc., 149 Cal. App. 3d 1206, 1211, 197 Cal. Rptr.
446, 449 (1984).
152. Mallen, supra note 7 at 247.
153. See, e.g., Cumis, 162 Cal. App. 3d at 374, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 505; Lysick v. Walcom,
258 Cal. App. 2d 136, 146, 65 Cal. Rptr. 406, 413 (1968).
154. The court in Lysick v. Walcom stated that the attorney owes a high duty of care
to both clients. 258 Cal. App. 2d at 146, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 413. The court added, however,
that the insured expects the same services from the attorney as if retained by the insured per-
sonally. Id. Since the attorney would owe no loyalty to the insurer if retained by the insured,
the standards are seemingly inconsistent.
155. One commentator has outlined the standard of undivided loyalty in detail. See Morris,
supra note 3.
156. See, e.g., Parsons v. Continental National American Group, 550 P.2d 94, 98 (Ariz. 1976).
157. See Allen, Some Conflicts of Interest Problems in Insurance Litigation, 37 INs. CoUrNs.
J. 512, 514.
158. See Morris, supra note 3, at 478-84. See also Siebert Oxidermo, Inc. v. Shields, 430 N.E.2d
401 (Ind. 1982).
Without considering the respected reputation of the attorney involved, we point out that
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Settlement information provided to the insurer by retained counsel
does not detract from the strict standard of loyalty to the insured.
Such information can be provided without prejudice to the insured
because only the prospects of liability to the injured third party are
involved. Promoting settlement is unquestionably in the best interests
of the insured. Further, public policy is advanced since the encourage-
ment of settlements reduces court congestion and delay.' 9
Two practical considerations present problems. First, since defense
counsel lacks full knowledge of the intricacies of the coverage dispute,
the effect of any communication upon the coverage litigation may
not be known. Awareness of potential coverage problems and defenses
can help the attorney assess the potential impact of disclosures. A
division of the two phases of the litigation by the insurer can also
minimize this problem. One attorney can handle defense and settle-
ment, another can handle coverage.' 60 Separate files are maintained
and communication between the two attorneys is limited.' 6' To isolate
the two phases further, separate law firms can be used for each phase.
Second, information relevant to the coverage issue might be needed
by the insurer to evaluate the underlying suit and formulate a settle-
ment position. In California, settlement decisions should be made
without regard to the merits of the coverage dispute.' 62 The insurer
often must settle with the belief that no coverage exists or face liability
for any excess judgment.' 63 The insurer, however, may recover the
amount of the settlement from the insured if coverage is denied later. 64
on a daily basis defense attorneys employed by insurance companies on behalf of
policyholders are called upon to deal with matters in litigation where the interests of
the policyholder and the carrier do not fully coincide. Under such circumstances the
attorney's duty is, of course, to the insured whom he has been employed to represent.
In response the defense bar has exhibited no inability to fully comply with both the let-
ter and spirit of Canon 5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. If it were otherwise
we suspect the desirability of requiring carriers to supply defense counsel-would have
long since disappeared as a term of the policy.
Id. at 403.
159. See Kelly, supra note 117, at 171.
160. See Goldberg v. American Home Assurance Co., 439 N.Y.S. 2d 2, 5 (1981) (giving ap-
proval to this procedure).
161. In Goldberg, steps were taken to assure independence and confidentiality between the
separate phases of the litigation. Each maintained a separate file and was cautioned not to com-
municate the contents of that file with the respective counterparts. Id.
162. CAL. INS. CODE §790.03(h)(5).
163. Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 429, 426 P.2d 173, 175, 58 Cal. Rptr.
13, 15 (1967).
164. Western Employers Ins. Co. v. Arciero & Sons, 146 Cal. App. 3d 1027, 1029, 194 Cal.
Rptr. 688, 689 (1983); Johansen v. Calif. State Auto Assoc. Inter-Ins. Bureau, 15 Cal. 3d 9, 19,
538 P.2d 744, 750, 123 Cal. Rptr. 288, 294 (1975).
1439
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 17
No reason exists to fear conflicts of interest if defense counsel lacks
the opportunity to prejudice the insured with respect to coverage. Thus,
the pivotal inquiry is the effect of the role of counsel retained by
insurer upon resolution of insurance coverage. If the factual deter-
minations made in the tort action are not binding on the insurer or
insured with respect to factual coverage defenses, nothing is gained
by manipulating the defense one way or the other. The insurer, in
fact, will be as interested in winning the tort suit as the insured, since
a judgment for the insured will automatically eliminate the coverage
controversy and save the insurer money. Judicially enforced ethical
considerations and a well-defined standard of loyalty can help pre-
vent harm to the insured in a subsequent coverage dispute. If findings
in the underlying suit have no effect on the coverage action, the in-
surer lacks the opportunity to harm the insured in that action. To
explore this point, the doctrine of collateral estoppel must be examined.
B. Collateral Estoppel of Coverage Issues
Collateral estoppel bars a party from litigating an issue that has
previously been litigated fairly.' Three factors must be present to
apply the doctrine. First, a final judgment on the merits must exist.,66
Second, the issue decided in the prior adjudication must be identical
with the one presented in the current action.' 67 Lastly, the party against
whom the plea is asserted must have been a party or in privity with
a party to the prior adjudication.
68
The first factor, a final judgment on the merits, is easily satisfied
in the third-party suit. The other two factors, however, are not
satisfied, which indicates that the judgment in the underlying suit will
bind neither insurer nor insured. This analysis considerably weakens
the argument that defense counsel, by influencing the court to find
that the acts of the insured were exempted from coverage, could favor
the interests of the insurer.
165. See generally Scott, Collateral Estoppel by Judgment, 56 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1942). The
interests of the state and of the parties require the putting of an end to controversies. If an issue
is actually litigated and determined, that issue cannot be litigated again between the parties even
though the issue arises in an action based upon a different claim. Id. at 1-2.
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1. Identity of Issues
As to the second factor, identity of issues, a finding on the basis
for the adjudication must be available.' 69 Findings of fact from the
judge in a bench trial, or special interrogatories to a jury can serve
this function.' 7 The underlying suits are usually tried before juries,
however, and special interrogatories are seldom used.', In fact, defense
counsel avoid using special interrogatories, in order to protect the
interests of the insured.' 2 Further, if the issues are somewhat dif-
ferent in the two actions, collateral estoppel cannot be applied.' 73 For
instance, the intentional injury situation involves the state of mind
of the defendant, but specific intent to harm the plaintiff is not an
element of a prima facie case unless punitive damages are sought.
74
Intent in tort actions merely involves whether the defendant desires
to cause the consequences of the act.' 75 In a coverage dispute, intent
constitutes a desire to harm the plaintiff. 76 Because coverage exists
for the unintended result of intentional acts, the act and the harm
must be intentional for coverage exemption. 77 Consequently, a fin-
ding in the underlying suit that the insured intended the act, such
as an assault, should not bind anyone in the coverage suit because
the issues are clearly not identical.'1
7
169. The burden of proof rests upon the party who relies on the judgment as-an estoppel as
to a particular matter to show that the matter was litigated, and that the matter was determined
by the judgment. Scott, supra note 165, at 10.
170. Id.
171. Mallen, supra note 7, at 259.
172. Such procedures should not be used without full disclosure and informed consent of the
insured. Id. This situation also applies to private counsel. Id.
173. The issues must be identical. Bernhard, 19 Cal.2d at 813, 122 P.2d at 895.
174. See Burd v. Sussex Mutual Ins. Co., 267 A.2d 7, 12 (N.J. 1970). A claimant who charges
intentional injury may recover even though intent to injure is not proved. Id. If the determination
of an issue is not essential to the judgment, the judgment cannot be given a conclusive effect. Wvm~oT,
LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS §100a, at 682 (1983).
175. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §8A (1965). See PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS §8, at 31 (1971).
Tort liability is not concerned with hostile intent, or a desire to do any harm. Bringing about a
result which invades the interests of another is the focus. Id.
176. 11 COUCH ON INSURANCE §44:289, at 449 (1982). The coverage issue is often framed in
terms of an occurrence which includes an accident that results in an injury neither expected nor
intended from the standpoint of the insured. See Morris, supra note 3, at 491. These terms have
been construed to include only acts performed with a preconceived design to inflict injury. Walters
v. American Ins. Co., 185 Cal. App. 2d 776, 783, 8 Cal. Rptr. 665, 670 (1960).
177. 11 COUCH ON INSURANCE §44:289, at 449 (1982).
178. The concept of intentionally caused loss does not extend to all damages awarded under
the theory of intentional tort. Even though the theory of judgment is intentional tort, the harm
for which damages are awarded may be accidental from the point of view of defendant and victim.
In these cases, the principal reasons for disallowing insurance against intentionally caused loss are
inapplicable. KEETON, supra note 2, §5.4(b) at 293. See also F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PRO-
CEDURE §11.18 (2d ed. 1977).
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2. Fair Opportunity to Litigate
At first glance, the third requirement seems easily satisfied-the
insured is the defendant and the insurer is in privity with the insured
by virtue of the insurance contract.' 79 Further scrutiny reveals that
this is not the case. The due process clause of the United States Con-
stitution mandates that a person must have had a full and fair op-
portunity to litigate an issue to be barred from relitigating the issue.' 80
The insurance policy prevents the insurer from realizing the oppor-
tunity to fully and fairly litigate the underlying suit. The duty to de-
fend provision in the policy requires the insurer to advance the in-
terests of the insured while defending the original suit.' 8 ' This situa-
tion forces sacrifice of the interests of the insurer when no such duty
exists.'82 An analogous situation applies to insureds. By surrendering
control of the defense to the carrier, the insured may have been
deprived of the opportunity to fully and fairly litigate coverage issues.' 83
Additional authority supports the conclusion that the outcome of
the original suit will not bind either the carrier or the insured.'" Sec-
tion 58 of the Second Restatement of Judgments provides that the
insurer is only precluded from relitigating issues determined in the
action against the insured if no conflict of interest existed.' 5 A similar
179. Comment, Estoppel, Third Party Practice, and Insurer's Defenses, 19 U. CH. L. REV.
546, 549 (1952). This assumption seems unwarranted because a conflict of interest eliminates the
requisite community of interest at the core of the privity concept. See Comment, Nonparties and
Preclusion By Judgment: The Privity Rule Reconsidered, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 1098, 1132-33 (1968).
180. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 95 (1980); Blonder-Tongue Lab., Inc. v. Univ. of Illinois
Found., 402 U.S. 314, 328-29 (1971). The insurer has never had a chance to present its own evidence
and arguments. See Blonder-Tongue, 402 U.S. at 329. The plaintiff must be permitted to demonstrate
that a fair opportunity procedurally, substantively, and evidentially to pursue the claim did not
exist. Id. at 333. See Comment, supra note 3, at 740.
181. J. APPLEMAN, supra note 25, §46.87 at 179.
182. The carrier has no duty to sacrifice its own interests when they conflict with those of the
insured. Keeton, supra note 118, at 1170.
183. See Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 536 F.2d 730, 735 (7th Cir. 1976).
184. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§39, 58 (1982).
185. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §58 (1982) states:
(1) When an indemnitor has an obligation to indemnify an indemnitee (such as an in-
sured) against liability to third persons and also to provide the indemnitee with a defense
of actions involving claims that might be within the scope of the indemnity obligation,
and an action is brought against the indemnitee involving such a claim and the indem-
nitor is given reasonable notice of the action and an opportunity to assume its defense,
a judgment for the injured person has the following effects on the indemnitor in a subse-
quent action by the indemnitee for indemnification:
(a) The indemnitor is estopped from disputing the existence and extent of the
indemnitee's liability to the injured person; and
(b) The indemnitor is precluded from relitigating those issues determined in
the action against the indemnitee as to which there was no conflict of interest
between the indemnitor and indemnitee (emphasis added).
Section 58 recognizes that a party is not precluded from contesting issues determined in an action
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position is taken with respect to insureds. Because control of the
defense has been surrendered to the insurer, the underlying suit should
have no binding effect on the insured.' 6
If no harm to the insured relating to coverage exists, no need for
independent counsel exists. The safeguards of professional responsibility
and collateral estoppel can provide enough protection for the insured.
Specific guidelines, however, are necessary for insurers to follow.
A SPECIFIC STANDARD FOR INSURERS
If the carrier seeks to retain the right to control the defense of
the insured, a certain standard of conduct must be met. The insurer
must defend the insured in good faith,' 7 and that requires nothing
less than the selection of an attorney who will represent the insured
alone, to the exclusion of the coverage interests of the insurer.' 8 If
this standard is not met, the insurer breaches the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing' 9 and should also lose the right to select the
defense attorney for the insured. Once this right is lost, the insurer
must reimburse the insured for the costs of obtaining independent
counsel as well as other defense costs.
This standard will not prejudice the insured. First, no clear reason
exists to assume that attorneys retained by the insurer will not follow
the clear guidelines of professional conduct. Since the insured is, in
effect, the sole client of the defense counsel, the same ethical obliga-
tions owed to other clients are owed to insureds. In addition, little
in which it appeared in one legal capacity when it appears in a second action in a different legal
capacity and there is a conflict of interest between the two capacities. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF JUDGMENTS §58 comment a (1982); Farmers Insurance Co. of Arizona v. Vagnozzi, 675 P.2d
703, 708 (Ariz. 1983). See generally Martin, The Restatement (Second) of Judgments: An Over-
view, 66 CORNELL L. REv. 404 (1981) (for a general discussion of the then newly enacted Second
Restatement of Judgments).
186. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §39 comment f (1982) provides:
As between the party surrendering control and the person assuming control, there may
be subsequent controversy over whether the person assuming control adequately
represented the interest of the party surrendering control. In an action concerning that
controversy, the party who surrendered control is not bound by the determinations made
against him in the original action because, by hypothesis, he did not have the opportuni-
ty that a party ordinarily has to present proofs and argument on the issues in question.
187. See, e.g., Comunale v. Traders & General Ins. Co., 50 Cal.2d 654, 658, 328 P.2d 198,
200 (1958); Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal.2d 425, 429, 426 P.2d 173, 176, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13,
16 (1967).
188. Once insurers select the attorneys, the reasonable expectations of the insureds require that
the attorneys conduct themselves in the same manner as if the insureds were paying the fees. See
Gray, 65 Cal.2d at 271-72, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 109-10, 419 P.2d at 173-74.
189. By breaching this standard, the insurer has injured the right of the insured to receive the
benefits of the insurance contract. I WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW (8th ed. 1973) Con-
tracts, §576, at 493.
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motivation exists for standard defense counsel to prejudice the coverage
prospects of the insured because any finding in the underlying suit
should not have any binding effect on the insured.
With the advent of the Cumis decision, insurers are faced with a
no win situation. If they defend without a reservation of rights, the
coverage defense is lost. If they assert the reservation of rights, con-
trol of the defense is lost. Adherence to strict guidelines of profes-
sional responsibility and collateral estoppel will ease the one-sided
aspect of this situation, while still promoting the interests of the
insured.
CONCLUSION
The tripartite relationship between defense counsel, insurer, and in-
sured poses unique problems to which no complete solution exists.
If a question as to coverage exists, many fear a less than competent
defense of the insured by the defense counsel. The courts have
responded by granting the insured the right to private counsel in the
event of a conflict. This solution has proved to be detrimental to
insurers and insureds alike. Skyrocketing defense costs stemming from
the Cumis decision force insurers to forego legitimate coverage defenses
and often coerce settlement. These costs are inevitably passed on to
insureds through increased premiums, making affordable liability in-
surance increasingly difficult to obtain. Policy modifications are not
the answer, thus another compromise must be reached.
The fear of the tripartite relationship is based upon the assump-
tion that conflicts of interest will influence the conduct of defense
counsel. If counsel retained by the insurer lacks the opportunity to
favor the interests of the insurer, this rationale is considerably
weakened. This comment has shown that the outcome of the underlying
suit should not bind either party, leaving defense counsel with no
incentive to prejudice the insured. In addition, adherence to well defin-
ed ethical considerations minimizes actual harm to the insured con-
cerning coverage. Thus, allowing the insurer to retain the attorney
selection function most effectively fulfills the duty to defend while
providing lower costs to everyone.
Richard E. Nosky, Jr.
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